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On the night of 16- 17 July 19 18, agents of the Bolshevik political police, the 
Cheka, executed the former tsar and tsarina, their five children, the family 
doctor, and three servants in the basement of a house in Ekaterinburg. Shortly 
after the tsar's abdication in February 1917, the Provisional Government had 
held the imperial family under house arrest at the palace atTsarskoe Selo. In July 
1917, amid calls from the left to exact revolutionary justice, and fears that the 
right might try to restore the tsar, Alexander Kerensky, the moderate socialist 
head of $e Provisional Government, decided to transfer the family to the 
isolated town ofTobol'sk in Siberia. The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 
191 7 initially had little impact on the lives of the exiled tsar and his family. In the 
spring of 191 8, the Bolshevik-dominated Ural Regional Soviet arranged the 
transfer of the family from Tobol'sk to Ekaterinburg as a means of preempting 
rumoured monarchist plots to liberate the imperial family. In mid-July, the local 
Bolsheviks - whether on their own initiative or at the behest of Moscow remains 
an open question - summarily executed the imperial family as a means of 
keeping them out of the hands of the anti-Bolshevik forces threatening 
Ekaterinburg. The city fell to Czech forces shortly thereafter. 
For the Bolsheviks, integrating the execution of Nicholas I1 into the 
narrative of the revolution proved problematic, in part because fixing the 
meaning of the tsar (but, somewhat paradoxically, not the tsarina) for an 
avowedly proletarian revolution was difficult, and in part because the murder 
itself played out in an untraditional and particularly unceremonious way. In 
October 1917, the Bolsheviks found themselves in the somewhat awkward 
situation of having staged a proletarian revolution in a country that had not yet 
executed its monarch. Trying Nicholas and carrying out the inevitable death 
sentence seemed both a necessary revolutionary phase and a powerful means of 
claiming the entire revolution - February and October - as a Bolshevik 
achievement. Yet the Bolshevik regicide hardly constituted an expected act of 
the proletarian revolution or an edifying re-enactment of the justice meted out by 
revolutionaries in England and France. As the local Ekaterinburg paper noted in 
its announcement of the tsar's execution, "the will of the revolution has been 
fulfilled, although in thls case many of the formal features of bourgeois judicial 
process were violated, and the traditional-historical ritual (tserernonial) of the 
execution of monarchs was not observed."' 
Subsequent Soviet accounts worked on one hand to excuse the departure 
from the expected revolutionary script, and on the other to demonstrate that a 
proletarian revolution had no use for the ceremony of bourgeois justice and its 
ritualized lulling of lungs. This dual approach complicated the effort to 
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memorialize the regicide as a straightforward revolutionary break with the past 
or to enshrine it as a pivotal moment in the history of the Revolution. Narratives 
written in the decade after the execution of the imperial family struck an uneasy 
balance between the desire to endow the regicide with transcendent significance 
and the impulse to dismiss it as the "unheroic end ofthe most ordinary, everyday 
pri~oner."~ In other words, there was no unequivocal answer to the question of 
whether the execution of Nicholas Romanov and his family was one of history's 
"great" revolutionary moments, or merely the routine shooting of a gang of 
bandits and speculators. Rather than providing a clear symbol of the demise of 
the old order, the destruction of the dynasty tended to raise vexing questions 
about the nature of the Bolshevik revolution and its enemies, the operation of 
revolutionary justice, and the role of individuals in the great revolutionary 
drama of the working class. By 1928, the regicide that had originally been 
represented as a necessary and momentous piece of the revolutionary drama 
largely disappeared from Soviet accounts of the Bolshevik revolution. 
REVOLUTIONARY SCENARIOS 
In Leon Trotsky's famous phrase, the Revolution of 1905 was the "dress 
rehearsal" for 19 17. Vladimir Lenin had proposed much the same analogy as 
early as March 1917 in his "Letter from Afar" published in Pravda. Rejecting 
the then-current notion that the fall of the monarchy was some sort of "miracle," 
Lenin proposed a theatrical metaphor: the "eight day revolution was 
'performed'. . . as though after a dozen major and minor rehearsals; the 'actors' 
knew each other, their parts, their places, and their setting in every detail."3 More 
than a convenient way of emphasizing the links between 1905 and 1917, the 
metaphor proposed that revolutions, at least-after they occur, can be understood 
as coherent dramas. 
The theatrical metaphor turned history into an anthology of well-rehearsed 
episodes and familiar characters that structured and dignified revolutionary 
improvisation. The "Great French Revolution" provided the most privileged and 
contested revolutionary script.4 The existence of such compelling historical 
templates did not mean that the current action was predictable. As Trotsky noted 
in his history of the Revolutions of 19 17, no one guessed that the demonstrations 
on International Women's Day would lead to the abdication of the tsars5 
Borrowing from earlier revolutions, Russian revolutionaries engaged in the sort 
of scriptwriting that was common in contemporary cinema - they wrote and 
rewrote while the cameras, rolled. 
In revolutionary Russia, Marxists and non-Marxists alike tended to 
approach history in much the same way that seventeenth-century English 
radicals read the Bible: with "high expectations" and the conviction that all past 
revolutionary upheavals offered "a message of direct contemporary rele~ance."~ 
History functioned as a field guide to archetypal revolutionary set pieces that 
could be recognized, reworked, revitalized, and restaged in the revolutionary 
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present. Working to situate themselves within the canon of progressive moments 
in history, the Bolsheviks represented themselves as the embattled republicans 
of 1793, the no-less-embattled Communards of 187 1, and even as the great 
emancipator himself, Abraham L i n ~ o l n . ~  As Vladimir Brovkin has noted in a 
different context, the Bolsheviks (and I would add non-Bolsheviks as well) felt 
acutely that their actions were "for the re~ord ."~  Making a "great" revolution 
meant making history on an epic scale. 
The Bolsheviks were by no means alone in looking for and finding 
revolutionary parallels everywhere from seventeenth-century England to 
contemporary ~ h i n a . ~  Such comparisons established the world historical 
significance of events in Russia. In a speech before the Petrograd Soviet in 
March 1917, Iurii Steklov, an inter-faction Social Democrat, traced the route of 
the French example of 1789 through Italy, Switzerland, Spain, England, 
Germany, back to Paris, and finally to Russia, where the fall of the worst of the 
tyrants promised to liberate the world.1° The revolution was understood as a 
"world" revolution both because it would remake the entire world and because it 
was part of an ongoing international historical drama. In newspaper accounts, 
events in Russia often became local and sometimes idiosyncratic productions of 
timeless revolutionary scenarios. The liberation of prisoners from the 
Shliisselberg Fortress could be understood as Russia's storming of the Bastille.' 
From the moment of the tsar's abdication, Nicholas I1 became the Russian Louis 
XVI and Alexandra the Russian Marie Antoinette. In the revolutionary 
imagination, the former tsar functioned as the talisman of counterrevolution, 
while his wife quickly became and long remained the embodiment of the 
immoral, foreign aristocracy indifferent to the plight of the people.I2 In 
emphasizing the queen's illegitimate political power, her lasciviousness, and her 
treasonous ties with Germany, the brief against Alexandra clearly - if 
unwittingly - echoed the charges brought against the "Austrian whore" by the 
~acobins. '~  The tsarina's supposed liaison with Rasputin was the subject of 
much gossip and political pornography. In the wake of the February Revolution, 
the Bolsheviks allegedly sold "obscene pamphlets" featuring the tsarina and the 
peasant holy man. When soldiers desecrated Rasputin's tomb in March 1917, 
they covered the walls with "rude drawings of Rasputin scrubbing Alexandra in 
her bath." A year and a half later, White investigators found similar pornographic 
graffiti on the walls of the house in Ekaterinburg where the family was killed.14 
Such images provided a powerfbl metaphor for a corrupt, anachronistic regime. 
As Michael Walzer has noted in his study of regicide and revolution, "The 
distribution of power for sexual reasons is the clearest possible expression of 
courtly decadence."15 
If Alexandra personified the decadence of the old regime, Nicholas seemed 
to embody its impotence and, paradoxically, the threat of counterrev~lution.~~ In 
early March 1917, the tone of the revolutionary press was euphoric, but also 
cautious; the magic that had transformed backward Russia into the freest 
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country in the world might prove short lived. Accounts of the abdication 
expressed worry that "the hydra of reaction might yet rear its head." The former 
tsar often appeared in the press as "Nicholas the Bloody," a tyrant on a grand 
scale, the murderer of workers and revolutionaries, the "first landlord," a 
pogromshchik, and a warmonger. As such, he stood as a concrete menace to the 
revolution. His arrest, an4 many popular voices added, punishment constituted 
matters ofjustice and necessity.17 On the other hand, Nicholas himself could be 
understood as unimportant, pathetic, the sorry product of a dying system, the 
puppet of capitalists and scheming ministers.I8 Yet even as the pawn of forces 
larger than himself, Nicholas posed a substantial, if symbolic, threat. He might, 
as Trotsky expressed it much later, provide "a live banner [for the Whites] to 
rally a r~und . " '~  
The French script both fueled and substantiated fears of monarchist plots. 
Facing increasingly radical opposition in the summer of 19 17, moderate 
socialists cast themselves as the defenders of the infant Republic bravely 
battling counterrevolutionary conspiracy.20 Any attack on their idea of 
revolution became an attack on revolution per se. Thus in June 19 17, Izvestiia, 
the official voice of the Menshevik-dominated Petrograd Soviet, equated 
Bolshevik calls for the ouster of capitalist ministers with the anti-Semitic 
propaganda of the Black Hundreds. A month later, revolutionaries 
uncomfortable with the Bolsheviks' increasingly aggressive rhetoric and actions 
labeled them, somewhat incongruously, as Jacobins, Bonapartists, German 
agents, and  monarchist^.^' 
In the months between the fall of the dynasty and the Bolshevik seizure of 
power, socialists paid a great deal of attention to the questions of where Russia 
stood in the arc of revolutionary action suggested by the French Revolution and 
of who was playing which role. Thus at the Congress of Soviets in June 191 7, 
delegates from across the political spectrum accepted debate on the meaning of 
"the year 1792" in France as immediately relevant to the present and future of 
revolution in Russia. Lenin, whose Bolsheviks were in the minority, urged the 
soviets to follow the example of republican France, and pursue revolution rather 
than reform. Explicitly forswearing the guillotine, he advocated the arrest of 50 
or 100 millionaires for a week or so. Lenin pictured the Bolsheviks as twentieth- 
century ~ a c o b i n s , ~ ~  Kerensky, who clearly preferred the Rights of Man and 
Citizen to the Republic of Virtue, offered a different vision of events in France. 
Arguing that the Jacobins of 1792 succeeded only in producing dictatorship, 
Kerensky counseled caution. But neither he nor anyone else denied the 
pertinence of the French 
The sense of participating in and remaking a long and venerable 
revolutionary tradition shaped the responses of revolutionaries across the 
political spectrum to the prospect of regicide. Kerensky explained his 
unwillingness to preside over the execution of Nicholas I1 as a refusal "to be the 
Marat of the Russian Revol~tion."~~ Other moderates in the Provisional 
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Government, who viewed the execution of Louis XVI as the first act of 
revolutionary terror, worked to discourage expectations that Nicholas I1 would 
necessarily meet a violent end. As calls for "revenge" against the imprisoned tsar 
became more frequent, moderates emphasized that mob justice had no place in 
a civilized r e v ~ l u t i o n . ~ ~  The July 19 17 transfer of the imperial family from 
house arrest in Tsarskoe Selo to Tobol'sk had obvious symbolism, but an item 
explaining the move in Izvestiia emphasized that the point was to ensure the 
tsar's safety and to keep him out ofthe hands of counter-revolutionaries. In this 
case, Siberian exile was in no way punitive.26 By contrast, the Bolsheviks, even 
before they seized power in October 19 17, presented themselves as ready to play 
the role ofJacobins, presumably with Lenin as Marat,27 although regicide hardly 
constituted an expected or prominent item on the agenda of the workers' 
revolution. 
While the Jacobins could inspire both admiration and revulsion, Napoleon 
represented the outcome everyone agreed needed to be avoided. Precisely who 
was preparing to play the role remained an open question, and the image of 
Napoleon proved powerful and malleable. After the July 19 17 demonstrations in 
support of "All Power to the Soviets," moderate socialists came to see the 
Bolsheviks as a party of Napoleons ready to destroy revolutionary freedom. 
After October, the Bolsheviks' opponents continued to attack them as 
"Bonapartists," a charge communists answered with the axiom that a workers' 
party could never play the role of Napoleon. The Bolsheviks for their part cast 
Kerensky or General Lavr Kornilov, who attempted a military coup in August 
1917 (or a long list of other military leaders throughout the Civil War) as 
Napoleon. As early as May 19 17, Lenin leveled charges of "Bonapartism" at 
Kerensky. By September, the Bolshevik press pictured revolution as a struggle 
between the proletariat and an increasingly desperate bourgeoisie ready to rely 
on a ~ a ~ o l e o n . * ~  
This sort of "labeling" of political enemies has been understood as a 
particularly insidious and disingenuous feature of ~ o l s h e v i s m . ~ ~  But the 
frequency with which leaders as diverse as Kerensky and Lenin reached for such 
pejoratives suggests a shared, if contested, vocabulary. More than a way to smear 
the opposition, involung the characters and scenarios of the revolutionary past 
provided a fundamental means of explaining and legitimizing revolutionary 
action and of claiming a place in revolutionary history. 
BOLSHEVIKS AS JACOBINS 
In October 1917, the Bolsheviks took power from the Provisional 
Government that had been formed in February They represented their actions as 
a proletarian revolution, a clear rejection of the bourgeois settlement of 
February. Still, the Bolsheviks continued to draw on analogies to other "great," 
if bourgeois, revolutions as a means of exalting their actions and of imagining 
revolutionary futures. An anti-Bolshevik uprising in the Don basin became a 
34 Left History 7.2 
"Russian Vendte," and was thereby doomed to fai1u1-e.~" A week after the 
Bolsheviks took power, an article in Pravda noted that "we are literally reading 
our own history" in accounts of the revolution of 1848 and the Paris Commune, 
adding that in Russia, where the revolution had the support of the peasants, the 
outcome would "obviously" be far happier.31 The October Revolution might 
have established the "world's first socialist democracy," but because it followed 
"historical laws," the action was familiar.32 In the summer of 1918, at a time 
when the Bolsheviks faced mounting threats to their revolution - one historian 
has described the Soviet leadership in July as in a state of "panic" - they took 
courage from the revolutionary elan of the army of the French republic.33 
The Bolsheviks had long welcomed the Jacobin designation, and by early 
1918, they were demonstrating an increasing ease with the violence widely 
associated with the label. From Lenin's statement in the summer of 19 17 that the 
guillotine would not be necessary, the Bolsheviks in power moved toward the 
stance that in a republic under siege radical action might be both unavoidable 
and salutary.34 Less than two weeks after the October Revolution, Izvestiia 
quoted with approval Heinrich Heine's Saint-Just: "The Committee of Public 
Safety was told/ By Saint-Just once to their noses:/ You can't cure grave ills of 
society1 With musk and attar of roses."35 
In the greatest of revolutionary dramas, the killing of the king constituted a 
pivotal moment,36 and the Bolsheviks continued to understand regicide in terms 
of the French example, despite the fact that Nicholas I1 was a rather 
unrepresentative example of the class enemies of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks 
seemed to assume that the public trial and execution of Nicholas I1 -something 
that a truly competent bourgeois revolution would have already accomplished - 
would simply update the French script. Looking back in 1935, Trotsky 
remembered proposing "an open court trial.. . broadcast throughout the country 
by radio."37 A political cartoon appearing in Pravda in late 1917 placed the 
image of Louis XVI holding his own head in front of a crowd of familiar Russian 
reactionaries: clerics, officers, well-fed capitalists (fig. 1). "Nicholas the 
Bloody" became "Louis XVII"; the caption warned that "counter- 
revolutionaries complain about bloodshed, but they're walking around with their 
heads on their  shoulder^."^^ By evoking 1793, the image managed at once to 
emphasize Bolshevik restraint and to leave little doubt as to the justice of 
revolutionary violence. 
Nowhere were the tensions between the desire to claim the epic mantle of 
the French Revolution and the effort to follow a new, self-consciousIy 
proletarian script clearer than in Bolshevik representations of Nicholas 11. From 
the Marxist point of view, the former tsar was largely an irrelevancy. Lenin often 
dismissed him as the "idiot Romanov," a somewhat embarrassing vestige of a 
"semi-feudal" Russia of sleigh bells and peasant holy men.39 It was wrong, 
Lenin asserted in August 19 18, "to blame kings and tsars" for the world war; "it 
was brought about by capital." Unlike their SR opponents, the Bolsheviks did 
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flK)AOBHK'b XVII: Y ~ n s n ~ t n b n a n  rTpaHa Pocci~! Many- 
IoTcn OHM na  nposonponurle- a nonrpa -peson~o~~o~cpa~  XoAaTa 
CO CBOUMH ronoDanH Ha nncvaxb. 
Figure 1 : "Louis XVII: Astonishing Russia! Counter-revolutionaries complain of 
bloodshed, but they're walking around with their heads on their shoulders." 
Pravda, 19 Dec. 1917. 
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Figure 2: The Kadet Party "Masked" and "Unmasked." The banner reads, "Long Live 
the Constituent Assembly." Pravda, 13 Dec. 19 17. In January 19 18, the Constituent 
Assembly met for the first time, and was quickly prorogued by the Bolsheviks. 
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TAYlnAF1 BEYEPR. 
Figure 3: "The Last Supper," Pravda, 8 Nov. 1917. 
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not believe that a few well-coordinated assassinations would change the 
Yet such Marxist commonsense did not diminish the tsar's 
counterrevolutionary power. The telescoping of revolutionary "phases" in 
Russia allowed the tsar, or, more accurately, the notion of a "former tsar," to 
remain, for the Bolsheviks along with other revolutionaries, a potent symbol of 
the almost miraculous transformation wrought by r ev~ lu t ion .~~  
In Bolshevik representations of the tsar, there was a clear tension between 
the need to catalog the legendary horrors of "Louis XVII" and the impulse to 
turn citizen Romanov into a prosaic, recognizable representative of the 
bourgeoisie. Nicholas the Bloody, who fit well into the French script, shared the 
stage with Nicholas the "bloodsucker," the "first capitalist," and the narrow- 
minded, uncultured speculator, who better fit the Bolshevik notion of class 
enemy. The kaleidoscopic, multivalent embodiment of constantly shifting anti- 
Bolshevik "conspiracies," Nicholas could be found everywhere, in a multitude 
of guises, the heart of the "hydra of counterrevolution." Actually, the 
Bolsheviks's opponents, recognizing the depth of popular feeling against the 
tsar, rarely evoked him; indeed, few favored restoring the dynasty.42 However, in 
the Bolshevik imagination, Nicholas's passive image seemed to possess an 
unholy power to unite the motley "apostles" of counterrevolution. At a "last 
supper" pictured in Pravda, capitalists, officers, and priests flashed toothy grins 
at a portrait of Nicholas 11. (fig. 3 ).43 
The former tsar could function as the symbol of every possible shade of 
counterrevolution largely because, as imagined by the Bolsheviks, he lacked a 
fixed class location. Nicholas was represented as king, capitalist, and petty- 
bourgeois shopkeeper. From the first, descriptions of the former imperial family 
represented Alexandra as possessing the qualities (all negative, to be sure) of a 
true aristocrat, while emphasizing the tsar's drunkenness, "limited mental 
capacity," and narrowminded pettiness.44 
From the Marxist point of view, conspiracy theories made a certain sort of 
sense. If tsarism ultimately served the class interests of the bourgeoisie, then 
contrary to expectation (and to the experience of February) the bourgeoisie, 
along with the Mensheviks and "white SR's," must be monarchist at heart. As 
Lenin explained it, "the dirty work of the Russian capitalists and landowners, 
who were in fact continuing the policy ofthe tsarthe people had overthrown, was 
covered up by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who pretended to 
be socialists while actually betraying socialism in the interests of the British and 
French stock  exchange^."^^ Soviet newspapers published a constant stream of 
revelations about far-reaching monarchist conspiracies involving improbable 
combinations of Black Hundreds, Kadets, foreign diplomats, Socialist 
Revolutionaries (SR's), White generals, Mensheviks, and bankers.46 
Locating the king at the center of counterrevolutionary plots also made 
sense in terms of the French script. Conspiracies had constituted a central 
feature of the symbolic universe of the French Revolution. Fran~ois Furet 
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explains the "aristocratic plot" as "the lever of an egalitarian ideology that was 
both exclusionary and highly integrative.. . the nation was constituted by the 
patriots only in reaction to its adversaries, who were secretly manipulated by the 
ari~tocrats."~~ The plot served a similar function in Russia. 
Anticipating "great events," but shaken by military setbacks an4 at the end 
of August, the attempted murder of Lenin, the Bolsheviks found monarchist 
conspiracy e~erywhere.4~ The diversity of their enemies meant that the 
Bolsheviks' notion of "restoration" had to be quite capacious, containing at once 
the desires of reactionary monarchists, the liberal bourgeoisie, and the 
"imperialists" intervening in the civil war. (They dismissed moderate socialists 
as the "lackeys" of the bourgeoisie)!9 Their opponents, whatever their politics 
or class origin, became "objectively" monarchist. The Bolsheviks insisted that 
there could be only "two camps," and eventually not only the liberal Kadets but 
also Mensheviks and left SR's ended up on the "monarchist" side of the 
 barricade^.^^ The Bolshevik press insisted that anyone - even those who had 
suffered exile and prison in the fight against tsarism - who opposed the 
Bolsheviks, "i.e., the workers and peasants," was as much a counter- 
revolutionary as the most rabid monarchi~t.~' This Manichaean language 
allowed the Bolsheviks to define their own actions as transparent, and to 
"unmask" all those who hid a desire to restore the pre-February status quo under 
the "pseudonym" of liberalism or even Marxism (see fig. From this point of 
view, the decision to prorogue the Constituent Assembly in January 19 18 could 
be represented as an effort to "save" the revolution from a body in which 
Bolsheviks were in the minority. Shutting down the assembly that they 
themselves had clamored for before October, the Bolsheviks represented 
themselves as the only actors who were not dissimulators. 
Turning Nicholas himself into the eye of the counterrevolutionary storm 
emphasized the Bolshevik claim that their revolution was the (true) revolution. 
Especially as erstwhile allies became enemies, it became essential for the 
Bolsheviks to cast themselves as the only legitimate revolutionaries. In Soviet 
accounts, even the often politically dim Nicholas recognized that in the 
Bolsheviks he met "real revolutionaries" for the first time.53 The presence of the 
former tsar on the anti-Bolshevik side of the barricades ruled out the possibility 
of a loyal opposition, and made regicide a legitimate phase of proletarian 
revolution. 
Still, staging the regicide remained a low priority. In the chaotic civil war 
conditions of 1918, organizing a trial in Moscow was no simple matter. The 
Bolshevik leaders in the Kremlin had more pressing concerns, and local 
Bolsheviks had other ideas. Trotsky later remembered bringing the matter up at 
Politburo meeting "a few weeks before the execution of the Romanovs." He 
suggested that "considering the bad situation in the Urals, it would be expedient 
to accelerate the Tsar's trial." Lenin opined that a trial "would be very good if it 
were feasible," and Trotsky let the matter drop.54 Historian Richard Pipes has 
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argued that the leadership in Moscow sent Vasilii Iakovlev, a "tried and trusted 
Bolshevik," to Tobol'sk in April 1918 with the task of bringing Nicholas, if not 
the rest of his family, back to the capital. However, "hotheads" from 
Ekaterinburg, who were committed to the summary execution of the tsar, 
thwarted the proposed transfer to Moscow, and moved the tsar and his family to 
Ekaterinburg instead. According to Pipes, the leadership in Moscow did not 
object to the change in plans.55 
As is well known, the Bolsheviks never publicly tried Nicholas 11. Precisely 
what happened to the imperial family, and at whose order has become one of the 
revolution's minor mysteries. Soviet newspapers initially reported that Nicholas 
I1 had been shot, his wife and son evacuatedto a secure location. In other words, 
initial accounts grossly misstated or at best understated what had actually 
happened - or rather what White investigators and later Soviet sources claimed 
happened. The regime admitted the murder of the rest of the family only in 
1921.56 All sorts of reasons for failing to report the murders of the entire 
imperial family have been proposed: uncertain information from the local 
Soviet that carried out the murders; a desire to cover up what had never been 
sanctioned by Moscow; fears of popular outrage at the lulling of innocent 
women and children; an effort to placate Socialist Revolutionaries, who were 
clamoring for revolutionary justice while the Bolsheviks continued to negotiate 
the family's safe passage to  erm man^.^^ 
However compelling, such pragmatic explanations tend to devalue the 
symbolic dimensions of the killing of the lung. Newspaper accounts explained 
the regicide as a straightforward response to fears that the advancing Czechs 
would liberate the tsar. But at least for the leadership in Moscow, regicide was 
more than a means to an end; it was an integral part of the drama of history's 
"great" revolutions. Whatever practical difficulties it solved or posed, the hasty 
shooting of the last of the Romanovs in a basement in Ekaterinburg did not make 
for inspiring or traditional revolutionary theater. Symbolic considerations help 
explain why newspapers provided no details of the regicide, aside from the fact 
that Nicholas had been shot - the modem revolution's preferred method of 
execution. As Trotsky noted much later, "Under judicial procedures, of course, 
execution of the family would have been impos~ible."~~ Such seemingly 
legalistic considerations mattered to those who hoped to emphasize the historic 
parallels between events in Russia and earlier "great" revolutions. Trotsky 
recognized that "[iln the intellectual circles of the Party" the murder of the 
imperial family "probably" produced "misgivings and shakings of heads." 
Indeed Trotsky remembered his own seemingly involuntary surprise when on 
his visit to Moscow after the fall of Ekaterinburg, he asked Lenin's assistant 
Iakov Sverdlov "in passing: 'Oh yes, and where is the Tsar?" 
"It's all over," he answered, "he has been shot." "And where is the 
farnily?"'And the family along with him." "All of them?" asked, 
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apparently with a touch of surprise. "All of them!" replied Sverdlov, 
"What about it?" He was waiting to see my reaction. I made no 
reply.59 
Instead of emphasizing the proletarian toughness of Sverdlov's "What about 
it?', Soviet newspapers presented a post factum trial of the former tsar, and 
emphasized the regicide's powerful historical antecedents. Articles and 
editorials overflowed with details of Nicholas's crimes that served to situate him 
in the elite, if less-than-enviable, company of Charles I and Louis X V I . ~ ~  Since 
initial press accounts failed to mention the tsarina's execution, parallels with 
Marie-Antoinette were never made explicit in the Bolshevik press6' Historical 
comparisons that purportedly revealed Nicholas's unprecedented criminality 
excused the failure to stage a public trial. Additionally, Pravda reminded its 
readers that Robespierre had advocated a summary military-style execution of 
Louis X V I . ~ ~  The Bolsheviks initially attempted to endow their problematic 
regicide with revolutionary weight and drama by casting Nicholas I1 as the 
descendant of Charles I and Louis XVI, and themselves as the unsentimental 
heirs of the Jacobins. 
JUSTICE, RITUAL, AND COMMEMORATION 
After Nicholas's death, the conviction that monarchist vipers were 
everywhere remained very much alive.63 Recognizing that nothing captured the 
sense of "before" and "after" better than the former tsar, the Bolsheviks 
continued to represent themselves as both the champions of the worlung class 
and the only defenders of the gains of February. A history of the revolution 
published in 19 18 argued that "Had there been no October, Nicholas or Michael 
would already be reinstalled in the Winter 27 February, 1918, the 
anniversary of the fall of the monarchy, became the "anniversary of the socialist 
rev~lut ion."~~ The following year, the convocation of the Third International 
overshadowed the commemoration of the end of the old order. Labeling the 
opposition "monarchist7' was more than conveniently insulting; it allowed the 
Bolsheviks to link February to October and to represent both as Bolshevik 
triumphs. 
The failure to stage apublic trial constituted the most immediate obstacle to 
commemorating the killing of Nicholas I1 as the Russian version of the regicides 
in England and France. Indeed for the regime's critics, the failure is the mark of 
the revolution's illegitimacy.66 As noted above, the Bolsheviks initially excused 
the failure to stage a trial as the only way to keep Nicholas from falling into the 
hands of the Whites and as the sort of justice Jacobins would have applauded. 
Later accounts ignored the historical parallels, instead pleading only 
extenuating circumstances. All emphasized that a trial had been in the works. 
However, the extremely precarious position of Ekaterinburg (which fell to the 
Whites shortly after the murders) prompted the local authorities to carry out the 
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inevitable death sentence without the f~ rma l i t i e s .~~  The litany of the regime's 
crimes served to underline the correctness of the sentence. 
Alongside the insistence that a trial was the ultimate goal, Soviet accounts of the 
regicide also expressed doubts that such a trial was necessary or appropriate in 
the context of a workers' revolution. For Trotsky, the execution of the entire 
family "was needed not only in order to frighten, horrify, and dishearten the 
enemy, but also in orderto shake up our own ranks." Only summary justice could 
produce such a decisive result. Bourgeois legal convention, Trotsky noted, 
would not have sanctioned the imposition of the death sentence on the family. 
(He did not mention the precedent for killing the queen).68 Other accounts more 
bluntly asserted that the tsar and his family simply received the same sort of 
justice all class enemies received in those years.69 
The "histories" of the imperial family's imprisonment and execution that 
appeared in the 1 920s stressed the purportedly class-specific personal 
characteristics of the Romanovs as much as the class basis of the old regime. 
Written by eyewitnesses, often in the first person, these accounts picked up and 
expanded the image of the spineless, "dead drunk" tsar dominated by the 
"hysterical," "German" tsarina.70 In one telling incident, Aleksandr Avdeev, the 
commandant ofthe house in Ekaterinburg to which the family was transferred in 
the spring of 1918, recounted the former imperial couple's very different 
reactions to the reduction in their personal staff. While the imperious Alexandra 
protested loudly in English, Nicholas, seemingly more at home with the 
conventions of the marketplace than the palace, calmly haggled (torgovalsia) 
with the Bolsheviks. Avdeev saw the tsar not as "Nicholas the Bloody," the 
terrible and awesome former head of state, but instead as an uncouth, petty 
bourgeois butcher (miasnik not palach).71 Such an enemy hardly required the 
ritual of a public trial broadcast across the nation on radio. 
The method of execution also established the Russian regicide as 
authentically proletarian. Soviet narratives of the regicide, in contrast to the 
White accounts that they sometimes took as their foil, omitted the ugly details of 
the murder scene. What they foregrounded instead was the revolver as the 
"extremely democratizing" tool of proletarian justice. Whereas anti-soviet 
accounts named names and often provided pictures of the murderers, in the 
Soviet telling "Nagant revolver shots finished off the condemned."72 The actual 
shooting seems not to have come off quite so But it was represented 
as swift, no-nonsense justice. 
Indeed efficiency and planning emerged as key features of Soviet-style 
justice. The Bolshevik officials who presided over the imprisonment and 
execution of the imperial family pictured themselves as resisting the demands of 
Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists, and overzealous workers for the 
immediate execution without trial (rasprava) of the t ~ a r . ~ ~ ~ h e  Bolshevik tone of 
superiority is somewhat surprising, given that the entire family was eventually 
executed without trial. The crucial difference was not the outcome, but the 
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process - revolutionary discipline versus revolutionary recklessness. Bolshevik 
justice could violate the legal niceties, but it always respected administrative 
procedure and the will ofthe party.75 
In Bolshevik histories written in the twenties, the regicide was first and 
foremost a successful government and party operation. Effective administration 
stood in for "bourgeois" notions of legality. The centerpiece of these accounts 
was often the transfer of the tsar, tsarina, and one of the grand duchesses from 
Tobol'sk to Ekaterinburg in late April 1918. This hazardous and important 
operation was described in far more detail than the shooting itself. The 
Ekaterinburg Bolsheviks represented themselves as overcoming the natural 
obstacles to travel in the early spring as well as the apparent double cross of the 
commissar sent from Moscow as they removed the tsar from a city 
honeycombed with counter-revolutionaries to the capital of the "Red Urals." 
Like Kerensky, who touted the secret transfer of the family from Tsarskoe Selo 
to Tobol'sk as "a striking illustration of the smooth operation of the 
administrative machine by the summer of 1917," the Bolsheviks viewed the 
passage to Ekaterinburg (along with the regicide and the effective disposal of the 
bodies) as a triumph of organization.76 
The accounts of the regicide that appeared in the twenties combined 
personal recollections with impersonal narratives of the revolutionary situation 
in the Urals and the technical aspects of the former imperial family's 
imprisonment and execution. The regicide existed at the intersection of small- 
scale human drama and the epic theater of revolution. In the final act in 
Ekaterinburg, abstractions faced one another: "the bullets of red guard revolvers 
cut short the life of the crowned bandit," and the new world unsentimentally 
destroyed the old.77 Elsewhere, the details of the imperial family's life in 
captivity humanized both the prisoners and their captors. This seems to be 
especially true with regard to the children. In a bid to soften up the Reds, Grand 
Duchess Maria flirted with the guards. Finding Alexei singing "To the fallen," 
the commandant provided the heir with a revolutionary songbook, which the 
tsarina promptly consigned to the fire.78 Tempered as they were with the 
everyday, the Bolshevik narratives resisted monumentalization. 
Initially, the Bolsheviks had represented the lulling of the king (the only 
murder they reported) as a critical practical and symbolic moment in the 
revolutionary drama, an event whose importance was preordained by the 
"Great" English and French Revolutions. In the heady and dangerous days of the 
Civil War, the Russian version's lack of the double ritual of public trial and 
execution seemed to mark it as authentically proletarian - ruthlessly efficient 
and aggressively unromantic. Writing in the fading spirit of the Civil War, Pave1 
Bykov, who had chaired the Ekaterinburg Soviet, opened his 192 1 account of the 
"last days of the last tsary' with the declaration that "the Ural workers are proud 
not only of their active participation in the proletarian revolution, but also of the 
fact that in the deepest bowels of the Ural mountains lie the worthless remains of 
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a tyrant, who paid with his life" for centuries of oppression. Bykov characterized 
the decisions of the soviets in Ekaterinburg, Perm, and Alapaevsk to "destroy 
everyone close to the autocratic throne" as "bold and decisive." He recounted the 
story not in order to justify the murders, but because it was good to tell of the 
deaths of lungs. Publicizing the recollections of comrades involved in these 
events served "to drive the aspen stake deeper into the grave of the Russian 
auto~racy.'"~ 
The expanded version of Bykov's account, published in the quieter days of 
the mid-twenties, took a noticeably more defensive tone. The workers 
unabashedly proud of their role in the regicide are nowhere in sight. Recalling an 
ethos and a style no longer in ascendance, the regicide itself became almost a 
footnote. The longer account included even fewer details of the murders than 
had the 192 1 article. The executioners remained the anonymous agents of class 
justice. However, Bykov seemed to recognize that White efforts to uncover the 
specifics of the execution itself threatened to turn justice into murder. His last 
chapter lampooned the White investigators who, following up even the most 
absurd rumors, set about digging up the garden of the house in which the family 
had been killed in hopes of discovering the body of Nicholas 11. He also made an 
explicit effort to balance the Red regicide against White terror. Many Bolsheviks 
(and some SR7s), he noted, paid with their lives to ensure the death of the 
dynasty. In this version, the defeat of Admiral Kolchak, rather than the 
memorializing of the regicide, "drove the aspen stake deeper into the grave of 
the Romanov dynasty."80 
In both of Bykov's accounts and in those produced to mark the tenth 
anniversary of the destruction of the dynasty, the regicide was shorn of its 
histrionics and lost its status as a key moment in the master narrative of 
revolution. Both the failure and the rejection of the effort to legitimize and 
explain the Bolshevik revolution by linlang it to an international revolutionary 
tradition worked to turn the regicide into a "non-event." When it became clear by 
1921 that the Russian revolution would not become an irresistible example for 
the rest of the world, universalizing historical analogies became reminders of 
failed expectations. Always a problematic episode of proletarian revolution, the 
killing of the king was replaced by symbols and narratives generated by the 
process of revolution in Russia. The rhetoric of conspiracies and "two camps" as 
well as the practice of substituting efficient administration for "bourgeois" 
legality remained very much in evidence. But by 1930, the revolutionary front 
had shifted. The "restoration" of the monarchy was no longer the galvanizing 
image that it had been during the Civil War. Trotsky replaced Nicholas as the 
constantly reinvented pivot of counterrevolution. Moreover, revolution was no 
longer conceived as an international drama; world revolution had given way to 
"socialism in one country." The critics of the Stalinist "revolution," first among 
them Trotsky warning of a Russian Thermidor, became the sole purveyors of 
analogies with ~ r a n c e . ~ '  
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Paradoxically, and somewhat reluctantly, commemorations of the regicide 
concluded that it deserved no special attention. In the accounts of the late 
twenties, commemorating competed not so much with forgetting as 
nonchalan~e .~~ The calm disinterest of the Council of People's Commissars 
upon hearing the news of the regicide became a model of the appropriate 
response to the end of the dynastys3 Bykov reported that the regicide was little 
noticed at the time and little commented upon later because people were 
absorbed in "gigantic creative work and great revolutionary struggle."84 In the 
1930 edition of his work, he ended with the tangible product of the struggle: the 
Mashinostroi works rising up near the spot where the "bones of the last tsar 
rotted in a swamp." This new monument eclipsed the only commemoration of 
the regicide in Ekaterinburg, the "Square of the People's ~ e n g e a n c e . " ~ ~  As V. 
Vorob'ev, the editor of the Ural Worker, noted, "this sort of thing doesn't happen 
every day, the execution of a tsar!" He himself participated in the most dramatic 
moment of his narrative, waiting nervously with members of the local soviet for 
word by telegraph that their extraordinary act had Moscow's approval. 
Vorob'ev's sense of the momentousness of the occasion stands in contrast to his 
conclusion that the "entire revolutionary nation" met the news in the same 
(implicitly correct) way that Lenin and the other commissars had - by quietly 
getting on with their business. The extraordinary officially became routine.86 
The regicide became important again only on the eve of the Soviet Union's 
collapse, when it functioned as a key scene in a very different historical drama.87 
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